Book Review: Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy by Schleicher, David
2002 / Book Reviews
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A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer. Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.:
Lanham, Md., 2001. Pp. 354. $29.95 (paper).
The last decade has seen the emergence of a set of ideas under the broad
banner of neo-liberalism that connect international law and international
relations. One of the key concepts in this burgeoning intellectual move-
ment, revived from the 1970s, is the idea of transnational governance,1
which posits that modern liberal states collectively organize their political
life in ways that go beyond simple hierarchical relations between solitary
sovereigns and individuals and instead rely on complex international net-
works linking various branches of government and key non-state actors.
Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy, edited by Mark Pollack and
Gregory Shaffer, is an attempt to add empirical weight to this liberal the-
ory.2 The book consists of a set of case studies, written by political scientists,
law professors, and legal practitioners, on the state of the New Transatlantic
Agenda, as agreed upon by the United States and the European Union in
1995. 3 These studies, which comprise in-depth analyses of many of the dif-
ferent aspects of the transatlantic relationship, from antitrust regulation to
trade disputes, are used to test the validity of some of the most important
theoretical developments in international relations and international law:
Robert Putnam's two-stage games between heads of government and their
domestic constituencies; 4 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's work on trans-
governmental relations;5 Anne-Marie Slaughter's ideas about disaggregated
sovereignty and the "real New World Order";6 and the literature on global
civil society.7 This theoretical quintet dominates the book-Keohane and
1. For a review of the main strains of thought in international relations theory and a discussion of the
direction of liberal international relations, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Symposium on Methods in International
Law: International Relations Theory, International Law and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361,365-66 (1999) (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds.).
2. Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in Historical and Theoretical Perspec-
tive, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaf-
fer eds., 2001) [hereinafter TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE]. Pollack and Shaffer also give an excellent
description in their introduction of the role that ideas of governance have played inside contemporary
neo-liberal thought in international relations in the 1990s. See id. at 3, 17-34.
3. The New Transatlantic Agenda was adopted by the United States and the European Union in De-
cember 1995, committing both parties to work together on a broad range of issues. It sets forth four
priority areas of cooperation between the United States and the European Union: the promotion of de-
mocracy and peace throughout the world; a response to global challenges like drug trafficking, terrorism,
and immigration; an expansion world trade and economic ties between nations, both bilateral and multi-
lateral; and the creation of the Transatlantic Dialogues. Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 15.
4. E.g., Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L
ORG. 427 (1988). See also Abbott, supra note 1, at 365.
5. E.g., RobertO. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,
27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974).
6. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183.
7. E.g., Paul Wapner, Governance in Global Civil Society, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS
FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE, 65-84 (Oran Young ed. 1997). Pollack and Shaffer give a
short overview of the literature on this subject. Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 29-34.
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Slaughter nod approvingly in quotations on the dust jacket$-and the book
accomplishes its twin objectives of testing these theories and using them as a
means to explore the state of the relations between the world's largest eco-
nomic and political powers.9 What most of the essays leave out, however, are
those factors that fall outside of purely institutional concerns, but that are
central to liberal thought: the ways in which ideas and domestic politics
shape the character of the relationship between the United States and the
European Union. Looming even larger than Slaughter, Keohane, and Nye
over these essays are the personal and ideological predilections of President
Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the other "Third Way" politi-
cians whose personal and ideological focus on institutional ties across the
Atlantic and "soft" issues like regulation, the environment, and trade pro-
vided the impetus for the interdependent political and governmental rela-
tionships discussed in each of the essays.10
The failure to address the role of both personality and ideology in the
formation and operation of the New Transatlantic Agenda leaves the book
with a serious problem: in a post-Clinton and post-September 11 world, it
is unclear whether the New Transatlantic Agenda will maintain its relevance
now that it is shorn of the political, ideological, and strategic framework
that gave it birth. Because the book avoids assessing the importance of po-
litical context, one is left wondering whether the New Transatlantic Agenda
will survive the late 1990s. This criticism aside, these essays serve as a wel-
come and useful guide through the substantive and theoretical thicket of
transatlantic relations, and as an excellent introduction to the ideas of the
most important contemporary liberal thinkers.
The book is divided into three major sections, covering "international"
(between heads of state), "transgovernmental" (among lower governmental
officials), and "transnational" (between non-state actors) affairs. Each section
takes up a set of theories and evaluates how these theories match up to the
on-the-ground reality of the transatlantic relationship in specific policy ar-
eas. In the first section, the often adversarial trade relations between the
8. Robert Keohane says, "Anyone who wants to understand how complex interdependence operates at
the beginning of the twenty-first century needs to read Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy....
This book shows how intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational politics interact to pro-
duce authoritative outcomes in the Atlantic area." Anne-Marie Slaughter agrees: "Transatlantic Governance
in the Global Economy combines a clear and compelling theoretical framework with strong and varied case
studies. It tells an important story not only about transatlantic relations, but about emerging forms of
global governance."
9. For an analysis of the state of transatlantic relations in the period following the 2000 U.S. presiden-
tial election and before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, see William
Wallace, Europe: The Necessary Partner, FOREIGN Azi., May/June 2001, at 16.
10. At the remarkable conference in which the leaders of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and the United States sat down to define their common "Third Way" ideology, German Chan-
cellor Gerhard Schroeder captured the sentiment of the room by saying, "this internationalization, this
globalization of the economies-should it not be accompanied by an internationalization of our economic
policies?" Turning Ideas into Action: A Conversation Between Five World Leaders on the Third Way, NEw
DEMOCRAT, May/June 1999, at 13.
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United States and the European Union are used to illustrate more traditional
models of liberal international relations theory, in which states relate to one
another solely through their executive branches, but are influenced by do-
mestic politics and domestic institutional organizations in the content of
those relations. The second section examines the disaggregated state models
of Keohane, Nye, and Slaughter by looking at the ways European and American
officials work together in fields like antitrust and food safety regulation. The
third section examines the development of a transatlantic civil society
through the lens of the Transatlantic Dialogues-state-sponsored coalitions
of private businesses, labor organizations, and consumer groups.
The first section focuses on the numerous trade disputes between the
United States and the European Union, including those about the creation,
and potential expansion, of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as
the substantive disputes under the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism.
John Peterson explicitly takes up Putnam's provocative two-level game the-
ory in which heads of state sequentially negotiate with each other and then
with domestic legislatures." According to Putnam, heads of state can use
the existence of the domestic level of negotiations to further their bargaining
power internationally, and can use issue-linkage during international nego-
tiations to create domestic coalitions that might otherwise be untenable to
achieve domestic policy goals. 12 Unfortunately, Peterson comes to rather
simple conclusions. He argues that the raging disputes on issues like ba-
nanas and hush kits for airplanes 13 were the result of heads of state clumsily
playing two-level games, giving in too easily to domestic pressure, and fail-
ing to sell adequately the benefits of free trade. 14 More interesting is Greg-
ory Shaffer's article discussing public-private partnerships of trade policy in
the United States and how this trend is repeating itself in Europe as a result
of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. 15 Shaffer argues that the inter-
play between government officials and business that has grown out of U.S.
trade rules and the WTO's adjudication system is complex and codependent.
Although their relationship is far from that of an attorney and client, trade
agencies and the private sector have overlapping but often conflicting inter-
ests; the ends of promoting free trade, or even the trade interests of a given
state, do not always coincide with the profit motives of companies. For both
private parties and governments to be successful at the WTO, they must
work together, because both financial might and governmental representa-
11. John Peterson, Get Away From Me Closer, You're Near Me Too Far: Europe and America after the Uru-
guay Round, in TRA SATLAN-TC GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 45.
12. See generally Putnam, supra note 4, at 427-60.
13. For a short but informative description of both disputes, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersman, Dispute Pre-
vention and Dispute Settlement in the EU-US Transatlantic Partnership, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE,
supra note 2, at 73, 86-89.
14. Peterson, supra note 11, at 68.
15. Gregory C. Shaffer, The Blurring of the Intergovernmental: Public-Private Partnerships Behind US and
EC Trade Claims, in TANsATLmANnc GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 97.
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tion are needed to win cases. This codependence is an excellent example of
how institutions can shape political growth, and highlights the benefits of
looking below the state level in order to understand the modern interactions
of states.
The relationship between political development and governmental struc-
ture is taken up even more fully in a set of essays collectively titled, "Trans-
governmental Relations; A New World Order?"'16 This section focuses on
the theories of Slaughter, Keohane, and Nye, all of whom examine the ex-
tent to which networks of lower-level governmental officials cooperate
within cross-border networks in order to achieve common policy ends. Youri
Devust's essay on antitrust regulators shows that administrative agency
officials in the United States and the European Union often work together,
informing each other of developments and sharing information. 7 He quotes
former Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert Pitofsky as saying,
"[olur staffs are on the phone with one another day in [and] day out."' 8
Transatlantic antitrust cooperation reflects the theory of the disaggregation
of-sovereignty elaborated by Slaughter, Keohane, and Nye, by showing that
constituent parts of individual states are becoming integrated internation-
ally. However, Devust notes that this type of transgovernmentalism is con-
strained by the different procedural rules and policy objectives on each side
of the Atlantic. 19 Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer further this point in
their essay on the regulation of food safety.20 They argue that differences in
the legal and political systems governing the food safety regimes in the
United States and the European Union are so great that the "fast, flexible
and efficient" networks Slaughter has predicted are, in fact, impossible.
Taken together, the essays in this section provide a helpful set of case studies
by which to examine the theory of transgovernmental relations.
Better still are the essays on the Transatlantic Dialogues. 2 1 The Dialogues
are organizations of businesses, consumer groups, environmentalists, and
labor union officials, from both the United States and Europe, that try to
coordinate policy and to inform transatlantic negotiations on their fields of
expertise and interest. These Dialogues may provide the basis for a transat-
lantic civil society. The essay by Francesca Bignami and Steve Charnovitz on
the ways in which these government-sponsored Dialogues have impacted
public policy is a bravura piece of political science.22 Employing a broad
16. TRA sATLAI c GOVERNANqCE, supra note 2, at 125.
17. Youri Devust, Transatlantic Competition Relations, in TRANsATLANTic GOVERNANCE, supra note 2,
at 127.
18. Id. at 138 (quoting Robert Pitofsky and Joel Klein).
19. Devust, supra note 17, at 145-49.
20. Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, The Challenge of Reconciling Regulatory Differences: Food Safety
and GMOs in the Transatlantic Relationship, in TRAmsTLANTic GovERNvANCE, supra note 2, at 153.
21. Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Transatlantic Relations: A Transatlantic Civil Society?, in
TRANSATLANTIc GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 211.
22. Francesca Bignami and Steve Charnovitz, Transatlantic Civil Society Dialogues, in Ta.NsTLsic
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 255.
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range of theoretical techniques for understanding interest groups' activity to
examine the day-to-day operation of the Dialogues, 23 Bignami and Charno-
vitz show how the Dialogues do not neatly fit into either state-based or
transnational civil society conceptions of international relations.24 Rather,
these organizations-most notably the Transatlantic Business Dialogue-are
at once state actors and private concerns that play an important role in the
creation of a wide set of public policies. 25 Bignami and Charnovitz argue
that, however useful, the Dialogues do not constitute a transatlantic civil
society; they are specific, issue-related coalitions, not "the civic tradition or
shared public sphere that would make [them] a society. '26 They conclude
that, in light of critiques coming from both civic republican 27 and public
choice theorists, 28 the narrowly focused Dialogues should be broadened via
public subsidy and integrated in order to build a true transatlantic civil so-
ciety.29 Regardless of the tenability of such a conclusion, this essay is a major
contribution to the literature and is the highlight of the book.
Bigmani and Charnovitz and the related essayists expertly note the way
that the specific actors involved and their ideological commitment to coop-
eration lead to the development (or failure, in the case of the Transatlantic
Labor Dialogue30 ) of the Dialogues. However, the book's other pieces-espe-
cially Pollack and Shaffer's introduction 31 and conclusion 3 2-ignore these
issues to the work's detriment. Even if they chose to dismiss these issues, it
23. Bignami and Charnovitz rely on everything from Mancur Olson's ideas about collective action
problems to Robert Dahl's sunny pluralism. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTriVE
ACTION: PuBLIc GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUpS (1965); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOvERNs?
DEMOcRACY AND POWER iN AN AMERicAN CITY (1961).
24. Bignami & Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 257, 278-83.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 281.
27. "Mhe center of the republican model is a community discussion in which individuals participate
directly and arrive at a common definition of the public good. Interest groups which filter individual
participation and fuirther narrow, selfish ends, are thought to interfere with this process." Id. at 280.
Bignami and Charnovitz reject this idea of civic republicanism, relying rather implicitly on an image of
pluralism straight from Dahl, supra note 23, but go on to argue, that combining the Dialogues would
mitigate the pernicious effects the civic republicans fear. Bignami & Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 281.
28. The public choice critique arises out of the work of Mancur Olson and argues that certain groups
have a disproportionate effect on politics because they can more easily organize (such as small groups of
big actors, like the big three automakers, that can overcome free-rider problems) and hence lobby more
effectively. See OLSON, supra note 23, at 33. Bignami and Charnovitz worry more about the free-rider
problem, because free-riding undermines the other, more diffuse Dialogues, thereby favoring the Trans-
atlantic Business Dialogue. Bignami & Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 282. However, Bignami and Char-
novitz think that fiurther government funding for, and increased efforts to include, the other Dialogues
would help mitigate the problems brought up by public choice theory. Id.
29. Interestingly, they reject the argument that these efforts should be abandoned to focus on interna-
tional civil society. They do so because they think that transatlantic efforts are more realistic, since
Europe and the United States share more culturally and institutionally with each other than they do with
the rest of the world. Bignami & Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 283.
30. Jody Knauss & David Trabeck, The Transatlantic Labor Dialogue, in TRANSATLANTIC GOvERN-
ANCE, supra note 2, at 235.
31. Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 3.
32. Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, in TRANSATLANnC GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 287.
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is important to discuss the impact of political ideas and actors on transatlan-
tic relations. The "Third Way" merits nary a mention in the book, the cen-
ter-right international coalition of the early 1990s is mentioned only once in
passing, and other political (rather than cultural and institutional) influences
are shunted to the side as somehow irrelevant. The question whether the
institutional issues at the core of the book might be limited in influence to a
specific political period and a specific set of actors is never addressed. As a
result, the book is not so much flawed as incomplete; it looks at the ways in
which one, or several, factors have influenced transatlantic relations, but
gives something less than a complete picture of the full scope of these rela-
tions.
This omission has serious costs. The change in administrations in Wash-
ington and the tragedy of September 11 have led many to argue that the
world has changed significantly.33 It can be said with some degree of cer-
tainty that some of the issues that this book deals with, such as transatlantic
cooperation on regulatory issues, will, at the very least, be deprioritized in
international politics for a period of time. It is anyone's guess what will
come of transatlantic relations in a world where the American government
seems less committed to either bilateral or multi-lateral integration on
"soft" policy issues, and where the focus of world leaders is importantly and
necessarily elsewhere. This book could have contributed usefully to this dis-
cussion by examining the effect of the ideas and political maneuvering of
leaders in the late 1990s. The lasting power of its analysis is instead some-
what muted, and unnecessarily so. Nevertheless, it remains an interesting
look at the state of transatlantic relations in the late 1990s and provides a
useful set of empirical tests of some of the key theories of modern interna-
tional relations. Given the importance, and rightful prominence, of these
ideas, Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy is a pleasant addition to
the literature and worthwhile read for scholars and laypersons alike.
David Schleicher*
33. See, e.g., Edward Luttwak, New Fears, New Alliance, N.Y. Tm fs, Oct. 2,2001, at A25; Anne Ap-
pelbaum, The New New World Order, SLATE, Oct. 1, 2001, http://slate.msn.com/?id=116462.
* J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School, 2004.
